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Abstract—Machine learning models are vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples: minor, in many cases imperceptible, perturba-
tions to classification inputs. Among other suspected causes, ad-
versarial examples exploit ML models that offer no well-defined
indication as to how well a particular prediction is supported by
training data, yet are forced to confidently extrapolate predictions
in areas of high entropy. In contrast, Bayesian ML models, such
as Gaussian Processes (GP), inherently model the uncertainty
accompanying a prediction in the well-studied framework of
Bayesian Inference.
This paper is first to explore adversarial examples and their
impact on uncertainty estimates for Gaussian Processes. To this
end, we first present three novel attacks on Gaussian Processes:
GPJM and GPFGS exploit forward derivatives in GP latent
functions, and Latent Space Approximation Networks mimic
the latent space representation in unsupervised GP models to
facilitate attacks. Further, we show that these new attacks com-
pute adversarial examples that transfer to non-GP classification
models, and vice versa. Finally, we show that GP uncertainty
estimates not only differ between adversarial examples and
benign data, but also between adversarial examples computed
by different algorithms.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have en-
abled researchers to model complex, non-linear relationships.
Of particular interest are classifiers, which take in complex,
high-dimensional input and, after passing it through multiple
layers of transformations, assign a class. Such classifiers
have been used in many application areas over the years,
including speech recognition, computer vision, robotics and
even automated theorem-proving [25]. It is not surprising that
this trend has also carried over towards safety-critical and
security-relevant systems, where classifiers are used for an
increasingly diverse number of tasks such as malware and
intrusion detection, spam classification, self-driving cars and
other autonomous systems [38], [2], [39], [35], [10].
∗First two authors contributed equally.
1Code for all experiments can be accessed by contacting the authors.
However, ML models have been shown to be vulnerable
against a broad range of different attacks [3], [26], [11],
[32], [45], [20], [5]. Adversarial Examples present the most
direct threat to ML classification at test-time: by introducing
an almost imperceptible perturbation to a correctly classified
sample, an attacker is able to change its predicted class.
Among other targets, adversarial examples have been used
to craft visually indistinguishable images that are missclas-
sified by state-of-the-art computer vision models [43], [11],
[29] and they enable malware to bypass ML-based detection
mechanisms without loss of functionality [40], [14], [16], [47].
As an answer to these attacks, defensive mechanisms have
been developed [8], [33]. These defenses mostly provide
empirical mitigations of adversarial examples, and therefore
provide no fundamental proof or guarantee of robustness.
Separately, another very recent branch of research is concerned
with providing a theoretical foundation of robustness against
adversarial examples, e.g. for verification [19], [17]. This work
has been mostly focused on DNNs. However, DNNs mostly
provide point estimates of parameters and predictions as an
output. The theoretical framework underlying DNNs currently
lacks the necessary tools to answer questions regarding confi-
dence bounds of predictions. Consequently, it does not provide
any information as to whether the data used for training can
actually support the predicted output. In fact, it has been
hypothesized that adversarial examples are sampled from a
distribution separate from the distribution of benign data [13].
In contrast to parametric models such as DNNs, Bayesian
non-parametric frameworks, in particular Gaussian Processes
(GP) [34], provide information about epistemic and predic-
tive uncertainty. Embedded in the well-studied framework of
Bayesian Inference, GPs provide analytical means of answer-
ing questions such as ”Is this prediction sufficiently supported
by my training data?”. Consequently, researchers have shown
renewed interest towards ML domains that take a Bayesian ap-
proach and account for uncertainties in spite of their possibly
less favorable classification capabilities in benign settings [6].
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In this paper, we study Gaussian Process Classification
(GPC) and the Gaussian Process Latent Variable Model
(GPLVM) in the presence of adversarial examples. In partic-
ular, we shed light on how adversarial examples translate to
Latent Variable Spaces that Gaussian Processes use to model
complex, non-linear relationships between possibly interde-
pendent features. We also investigate the transferability [31],
[44] between different models, i.e. how well adversarial exam-
ples from classical DNN attacks translate into attacks for GPC
and GPLVM, and vice versa. We conclude that adversarial ex-
ample attacks on Gaussian Processes are effective and translate
well into other domains in a gray box setting. Moreover, we
empirically evaluate the effects of such adversarial examples
on confidence estimates and find evidence that such estimates
can be used to distinguish the distributions of adversarial
examples and benign data points.
In detail, our contributions are as follows:
• We propose two new attacks to compute adversarial
examples for GPC: GPFGS and GPJM. Both attacks are
based on the well-studied FGSM [11] and JSMA [32]
attacks. We show formally how to compute the necessary
forward derivative for GPC.
• We propose Latent Space Approximation Networks
(LSAN) as a means of modeling the latent space of
non-parametric GP models using DNNs. Thereby, LSAN
allows us to directly compute attacks on GPLVM-based
classifiers and other kernalized classifiers.
• We study the transferability of standard attacks, LSAN,
GPFGS and GPJM in a grey-box setting, where the
attacker has access to the training data, but not the ML
model itself. We observe that the attacks transfer between
all different models of attacks and vice versa.
• We empirically study how adversarial examples affect
the uncertainty estimates of GPs. We observe that the
uncertainty estimates differ between malicious and benign
data. We also take a first step towards leveraging these
findings for defenses.
II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In this section, we present the research questions (RQ) we
investigate in this paper. The overarching goal of stating and
subsequently, answering these research questions is to deepen
the understanding of how adversarial examples translate to
a Bayesian Inference setting using Gaussian Processes as a
specimen. We provide the background to deeply understand
these questions in the followings sections. The research ques-
tions are divided into three main areas of interest: test-time
attacks on GP classification, test-time attacks on GPLVM
based classification and the impact of adversarial examples
on uncertainty in a GP.
A. Attacks on GP Classification
The first research question is concerned with the susceptibil-
ity of GP classification to adversarial examples in a worst-case
scenario.
RQ 1: Is an adversary with full knowledge of both the
GPC model and the underlying training dataset able to craft
adversarial examples for a given GP classifier?
We answer this question by introducing two novel attacks
on GP classification which we introduce in more detail in
Section IV. Subsequently, we want to analyze how well these
examples transfer to other ML models trained on the same
dataset, and vice versa.
RQ 2: Do adversarial examples crafted on a GPC transfer
to other classifiers for the same dataset?
RQ 3: Do adversarial examples crafted on other classifiers
transfer to GPC trained on the same dataset?
B. Latent Space Approximation Network attacks on GPLVM
Classification
Similar to RQ 1–3 we are interested in how well an
attacker is able to craft adversarial examples on GPLVM
Classification. As a part of this attack, we introduce Latent
Space Approximation Networks, which try to approximate the
Latent Variable Model of GPLVM based classification. In
addition to evaluating the effectiveness of an attack we are
also interested in how well this approximation simulates its
target’s behavior. Our target metric for this comparison is the
classifiers’ respective accuracy on a benign test dataset.
RQ 4: Does LSAN produce a classifier with accuracy signif-
icantly better than random choice?
Furthermore, we evaluate how effective the attacks crafted
on LSAN.
RQ 5: Does LSAN allow us to craft attacks on the ap-
proximated GPLVM+SVM/linear SVM classifier that decrease
accuracy more than other attacks?
In this setting, we distinguish between the data as repre-
sented by GPLVM and the kernel used by other ML models.
While LSAN were created to craft attacks on GPLVM classi-
fication, they are are a generic approach an could potentially
be used to craft attacks for any other kernelized method
or classifier. Another interesting question is to what extend
LSANs inherit the emulated model’s robustness to adversarial
examples (if any) given that LSAN is a standard DNN. To ob-
tain interpretable results, we consider three comparisons: DNN
and the approximated model (as a baseline), the approximated
model and LSAN, and finally LSAN and DNN.
RQ 6: Given a latent space model, its corresponding LSAN
and a DNN with the same architecture as the LSAN:
a) When exposed to adversarial examples, will a latent
space model and a DNN classify these examples with
different accuracies?
b) When exposed to adversarial examples, will a latent
space model and its corresponding LSAN classify these
examples with different accuracies?
c) When exposed to adversarial examples, will an LSAN and
a DNN classify these examples with different accuracies?
C. Influence of Adversarial Examples on Uncertainty
As briefly noted in Section I, in addition to providing point
probability estimates for hypothesis classes, GP classification
also provides information about the uncertainty of its posterior
prediction. The unsupervised counterpart of GPC, GPLVM,
also provides uncertainty estimates over its latent represen-
tation. A common belief within the research community is
that estimates of the predictions certainty could potentially be
exploited to distinguish adversarial examples.
RQ 7: Do uncertainty estimates for GP classification differ
between adversarial examples and benign samples?
RQ 8: Do uncertainty estimates for GPLVM latent space
mapping differ between adversarial examples and benign
samples?
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly review ML classification, Deep
Neural Networks (DNN) and Support Vector Machines (SVM)
before providing a introduction to Gaussian Processes Classi-
fication (GPC) and Gaussian Process Latent Variable Model
(GPLVM) based classification. We also formally define the
threat model by providing a defintion of the considered adver-
saries and attacks.
A. Classification
In classification, we consider a dataset {Xtr, Ytr, Xt, Yt}.
The goal is to train a classifier F ( , θ) by adapting the
parameters θ based on the training data {Xtr, Ytr} such that
F (Xt, θ) ≈ Yt, i.e. F correctly predicts the label Yt of before
unseen test data Xt.
B. Test-Time Attacks and Adversarial Examples
Given a trained classifier F ( , θ), test-time attacks try to
find a small perturbation δ for a test sample x ∈ Xt such that
min δ : F (x, θ) 6= F (x+ δ, θ) (1)
i.e., the sample x′ = x + δ is classified as a different
class than the original input. The sample x′ is then called
an adversarial example.
To compute the perturbation δ, we compute the deriva-
tive of loss w.r.t. the input, as introduced by Szegedy et
al. [42]. Goodfellow et al. [11] refined this, introducing the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). This attack introduces a
global perturbation dependent on a given  and the previously
mentioned derivative. Another attack, introduced by Papernot
et al. [32], is based on the derivative of the trained model
w.r.t. the inputs near a particular sample. This approach is
called the Jacobian Based Saliency Map Approach (JSMA).
Many attacks have been introduced based on this methodology
[4], [30], [7]. Although superficially different, Engelbrecht [9]
showed that two methods are actually equivalent under some
conditions (though differing in the used norm).
Additionally, there exist other methods to compute ad-
versarial examples based on genetic programming [46],
mimicry [27], [4] or generative networks [16]. Finally, ad-
versarial examples are not limited to DNNs and there exist
variants specific to other ML models [31], [28], [15].
C. Threat Model
We distinguish different threat models based on adversarial
knowledge and adversarial capabilities.
Adversarial Knowledge. In the white-box setting, the ad-
versary has unrestricted access to the model, its parameters and
its training data. A black-box adversary has access to neither
the model nor the training data. In contrast, the grey-box
adversary has no knowledge of the model and its parameters,
but is still granted access to the training data. This is equivalent
to giving the attacker access to a query-able oracle, leaving the
attacker oblivious with regards to the ML algorithm applied
while still providing her unrestricted access to classification
results. Although security in a white-box setting is a more
desirable security-property, we investigate grey-box setting as
a more tractable and realistic goal for ML models to achieve
in an adversarial environment: the trained algorithm is usually
protected from unauthorized access, but its training data might
be crowd-sourced or even publicly accessible.
Adversarial Capabilities. In the adversarial example set-
ting, we seek to constraint the adversarial capabilities by
upper-bounding the amount of perturbation δ an attacker can
introduce to a sample without the change becoming noticeable
to an oracle. This requires one to define appropriate distance
metrics. These metrics relate to the type of data: Real valued,
normalized data contains features in the interval between
[0, 1.0], whereas binary data only provides two values for each
feature, 1 and 0. Typical metrics for attacks are the L0, L2 and
L∞ norm. The L2 and L∞ norms are well suited to image or
real-valued data, as they measure introduce small changes in
multiple features. For binary data, it is impossible to control
the amount of perturbation of individual features: values are
either flipped or not.
Transferability and Attacker Capabilities in this paper.
In this work, we investigate transferability, i.e. the ability
of adversarial examples from the same dataset to generalize
to different ML classifiers trained on the same dataset. We
therefore consider a grey-box adversary when evaluating RQs
relating to transferability to exclude other factors that might
influence the models and thus affect transferability. We further
consider a white-box adversary to evaluate RQs relating to the
vulnerability of GPC and GPLVM.
Finally, we use L0 attacks on binary data and L2 or L∞
attacks on real-valued data.
D. (Deep) Neural Networks
A neural network F is composed of layers, where the output
of one layer is fed as input into the next layer. The weights
of layer i weight each particular input xi−1 according to a
weight wi and a bias bi and then apply an activation function
fi, usually a Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU). We consider θ
to be the set of all weights and biases in the network. A
Deep neural network (DNN) also contains several intermediate
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Fig. 1. A sample from a GP can be considered to be a sample of an infinite
dimensional Gaussian distribution of candidate functions. Putting a prior on
this distribution, restricts it to likely explanations, visualized as blue lines in
Figure 1a. The available functions are then further reduced by the presented
training data (cf. Figure 1b): In areas where data is sparse, the spread of
the functions is higher than in areas with a higher density of training data.
Since the range of these functions is unbounded, we apply a link function
(cf. Figure 1c) to obtain a probability estimate used for classification. This
function then provides the mean (black line) used for prediction and the
variance or uncertainty (blue area).
layers, which are referred to as hidden layers. The optimization
problem arising when such a deep network is trained is non-
convex, hence neural networks are trained using stochastic
gradient descent.
E. Support Vector Machines
In contrast to DNNs, Support Vector Machines (SVM) form
a convex problem with a unique solution. Given the training
data, the goal is to compute a hyperplane separating the data.
To achieve a nonlinear decision boundary, a SVM can be
kernelized. Since the RBF kernel is similar to the covariance
function in GP settings, as we will see now, we investigate
RBF SVM in this work. To be able to tell apart SVM and RBF
effects, we further also study the linear SVM. Another reason
to study SVM is that, as we will see now, GPLVM only yields
a latent space, and not a classification output. We thus have
to apply a classifier on top, and need the original classifier
without the preprocessing as a baseline. When employing
SVM on top of GPLVM for classification we pick the kernel
according to performance.
F. Gaussian Processes
We consider two applications of Gaussian Processes. First,
we use GP directly for classification (GPC). Second, we de-
scribe the Gaussian Process Latent Variable Model (GPLVM),
which is a mapping from the data to a latent space. Subse-
quently, GPLVM is used as a pre-processor to train a SVM
classifier.
GP Classification. We introduce here GPC [34] for two
classes using the Laplace approximation. The goal is to predict
the labels Yt for the test data points Xt accurately. We first
consider regression, and assume that the data is produced by
a GP and can be represented using a covariance function k:[
ytr
yt
]
= N
(
0,
[
Ktr Ktt
KTtt Kt
])
, (2)
where Ktr is the covariance of the training data, Kt of the test
data, and Ktt between test and training data based on k. The
optimum estimate for the posterior mean at given test points,
assuming a Gaussian likelihood function is (from [34], page
44, equation 3.21),
y∗t = K
T
ttK
−1
tr ytr , (3)
which is at the same time the mean of our latent function
f∗. We will not go into details here on how to optimize
the parameters of the covariance function k, but instead
move from regression to classification. Since our labels yt
are not real valued, but class labels, we ‘squash’ this output
using a link function σ(·) such that the output varies only
between the two classes (cf. Figure 1). For classification, the
optimization can be simplified using the previously stated
Laplace approximation. At this point, we want to refer the
interested readers to Rasmussen et al. [34].
In addition to the mean, as explained above, we are also
able to compute the variance. This allows us to obtain the
uncertainty for GPC, and will be used later in this work.
GP Latent Variable Model. GPC learns based on labels.
This introduces an implicit bias: we assume for example that
the number of labels is finite and fixed. Furthermore, the
curse of dimensionality affects classification. This curse affects
distance measure on data points. In higher dimensions, the
ratio between nearest and furthest point approximates one.
All data points are thus uniformly distant, impeding classi-
fication: it becomes harder to compute a separating boundary.
Consequently, we are interested in finding a lower dimensional
representation of our data.
These two issues are taken into account when using
GPLVM. Its latent space is a lower-dimensional representation
of the data where labels are ignored. A particular property of
this latent space is further that it allows for nonlinear con-
nections in the feature space to be represented. Additionally,
GPLVM models uncertainty estimates, analogously to GPC.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first introduce two direct attacks on
GP classification. Afterwards, we introduce Latent Space Ap-
proximation Networks (LSAN) to approximate GPLVM-based
classification. As we will see, these attacks can be leveraged
to attack other kernelized methods.
A. Attacks on GPC
As for all classifiers, to produce an adversarial example we
need to find the gradient in the output with respect to the input
dimensions. We consider the chain of gradients for the output
σ¯∗ = σ(f∗), and (test) input x∗ ∈ Xt:
∂σ¯∗
∂x∗
=
∂σ¯∗
∂f∗
× ∂f∗
∂k
× ∂k
∂x∗
(4)
where f∗ and k are the associated latent function and covari-
ance function, respectively.
Note that for our attack, we are only concerned with the rel-
ative order of the gradients, we are not interested in the actual
values. Unfortunately, σ¯∗ does not vary monotonically with
f∗. For example, consider that if f∗ increases slightly, thus
becoming more positive, the variance of f∗ would increase
massively as well. However, through the link function the
mean of σ¯∗ would at the same move downwards, approaching
0.5.
We use the gradient of f∗ instead a numerical approximation
to σ¯∗. The reasoning is as follows: since we are in a setting
of binary classification, we are only interested in moving the
prediction across the 0.5 boundary. No change in variance
can cause this, instead a change in the mean of f∗ is required.
Indeed one can note that the gradient of f∗ is an upper bound
on the gradient of σ¯∗. This is due to the fact that the link
function ‘squashes’ the input, however preserving the changes.
The fastest we can get from one probability threshold pt to its
opposite 1 − pt is when there is no variance. So finding the
gradient of f∗ is sufficient.
Let us first rewrite the expected value of f∗ in Equation (3)
given a single test point x∗:
E[f∗] = k(x∗)TK−1tr ytr (5)
From here, we can easily move on to the first part of the
gradient,
∂f∗
∂k
= K−1tr ytr (6)
where the terms are both constant w.r.t. the test input x∗. The
gradient of the kernel w.r.t. the inputs depends on the particular
kernel that is applied. In our case, for the RBF kernel, between
training point x ∈ Xtr and test point x∗, the gradient can be
expressed as
∂k(x∗, x)
∂x∗i
=
1
l2
(xi − x∗i )k(x∗, x) (7)
where xi and x∗i each denote feature or position i of the
corresponding vector or data point and l denotes the length-
scale parameter of the kernel. Using the assumption above
the gradient of the output σ¯ with respect to the inputs is
proportional to the product of Equation (6) and Equation (7).
Finally, we introduce the attacks, conceptually related to
FGSM and JSMA. The first one introduces a global change
based on the sign of the gradients (of a single sample x and
the classifier f∗) and some . We depict it in Algorithm 1 and,
due to its similarity with FGSM we call it GPFGS. For both
attacks we assume the kernel to be RBF (and thus drop the
explicit notation of the kernel gradients). We also compute the
gradient as the product of Equation (6) and Equation (7) in
both algorithms.
In Algorithm 2 we compute the gradients and add or remove
a feature depending on the strongest gradient, analogous
to JSMA. Consequently, we call this attack GPJM. In this
algorithm, we keep track of the modified features, to avoid
Algorithm 1 Given an input sample x and the latent function
f∗, we compute an adversarial example, x∗ using GPFGS. 
denotes the perturbation introduced for each feature.
Require: x, f∗, 
1: x∗ ← x∗ + ×sign(∇f∗)
2: return x∗
Algorithm 2 Given an input sample x and the latent function
f∗, we compute an adversarial example, x∗ using GPJM. t
denotes the maximal number of features we are allowed to
change.
Require: x, f∗,σ¯∗, t
1: x∗ ← x
2: changed ← [ ]
3: while σ¯∗(x) > 0.5 equals σ¯∗(x∗) > 0.5 do
4: if length(changed) > t then
5: return Failure
6: end if
7: grads ← ∇f∗
8: grads[changed]← 0.0
9: index ← max (abs(grads))
10: x∗[index]← 1.0×sign(grads)[index]
11: changed.append(index)
12: end while
13: return x∗
changing a feature twice. We also allow changes in both
directions of the gradients, as visible in line 10. We iteratively
change features until a sample is misclassified, or too many
features are changed (more than t).
B. Attacks on GPLVM using Latent Space Approximation
Networks
The GPLVM mapping is, similar to kernels, hard to invert.
The change in the original data for a corresponding change
in latent space is usually hard to determine. We thus try to
approximate these methods with DNN, which are easier to
invert: there is a wide range of known attacks. The challenge is
therefore to produce a substitute Latent Space Approximation
Network (LSAN), which is as similar as possible to the original
latent space kernel.
The rough idea is depicted in Figure 2. We approximate the
latent space and the classifier by using a DNN. To achieve
this, we train the second last layer to mimic the latent space,
and treat the last layer as a linear classifier (trained on the
latent space as input). If this classifier happens to be nonlinear,
we add another intermediate layer to achieve nonlinearity. To
apply the known attacks for neural networks, we combine the
two parts that are trained separately. As visible in Figure 2,
we do this by feeding the output of the latent network directly
to the classifier network.
Finally, a slight adaption to this scheme also enables us to
approximate kernelized SVMs. The difficulty in this setting is
that the kernel is a distance function between two points, and
thus the latent space is more implicit than in GPLVM. We
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Fig. 2. The intuition of LSAN. The first network is trained on a latent space,
the second to classify input from this latent space. After training, the two
networks are combined and yield one DNN classifier.
hence train the output layer of the latent space on the kernel
matrix given some fixed points from the dataset. More pre-
cisely, the output neurons 1 . . . n are trained on the particular
distance of some data points 1 . . . n selected from Xtr.
We can then proceed by using any of the DNN-specific
attacks on the LSAN to produce adversarial examples for the
original classifiers.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Before we evaluate the research questions posed in Sec-
tion II, we briefly describe the setting of our evaluation. We
start with the datasets on which the different ML models where
evaluated, and move then to the ML models used and their
respective implementations2. Before diving into the evaluation,
we also briefly comment on convergence and accuracies of all
models.
A. Data
We seek to evaluate adversarial examples in two security
contexts: Malware classification and Spam detection. In addi-
tion to this, we want to evaluate all mechanisms in a commonly
used ML benchmark for classification tasks. We carefully
selected these datasets to account for the diversity in data
types ML models face across different application domains:
individual data features may contain binary (e.g. static code
features), integer (e.g. pixel values) or real-valued (e.g. fre-
quencies) data. Whole datasets may contain widely different
amounts of features and with different feature sparsity.
Hidost. Our Malware dataset consists of the PDF Malware
data of the Hidost Toolset project [41] The dataset is composed
of 439, 563 PDF Malware samples, of which 407, 037 are
labeled as benign and 32, 567 as malicious. Datapoints consist
of 1223 binary features and individual feature vectors are
2The code, and thus any further details, can be accessed by contacting the
authors
likely to be sparse. We split it in 95% training and 5%.
This still leaves us with more than 20, 000 test data points
to craft adversarial examples, where many attacks are very
time consuming to compute.
Spam. The second security-relevant dataset is an email
Spam dataset [23]. It contains 4, 601 samples. Each sample
captures 57 features, of which 54 are continuous and rep-
resent word frequencies or character frequencies. The three
remaining integer features contain capital run length infor-
mation. This dataset is slightly imbalanced: roughly 40% of
the samples are classified as Spam, the remainder as benign
emails. We split this dataset randomly and use 30% as test
data.
MNIST. Finally, we use the MNIST benchmark dataset [22]
to select two additional, binary task sub-datasets. It consist
of roughly 60, 000, 28 × 28 pixels, black and white images
of handwritten single digits. There are 50, 000 training and
10, 000 test samples, for each of the ten classes roughly the
same number. We select two binary tasks: 1 versus 9 and 3
versus 8 (denoted as MNIST91 and MNIST38 respectively).
We do this in an effort to study two different tasks on the same
underlying data representation, i.e. the same number and range
of features, yet with different distributions to learn.
B. Models
We investigate transferability across multiple ML models
derived by different algorithms. In some cases, dataset-specific
requirements have to be met for classification to succeed.
GPLVM. We train GPLVM generally using 6 latent di-
mensions with the exception of the Spam dataset, where more
dimensions (32) are needed for good performance. We further
use SVM on top of GPLVM to produce the classification
results, a linear SVM for the MNIST91 tasks and an RBF-
kernel SVM for all other tasks.
LSAN. We distinguish between LSAN approximating
GPLVM (GPDNN), linear SVM (linDNN) and RBF SVM
(rbfDNN). All of them contain two hidden layers with half
as many neurons as the datasets’ respective features. The
layer trained on latent space encompasses 30 neurons for the
SVM networks and 6 neurons for GPDNN, except for the
Spam dataset, where we model 32 latent variables. From this
latent space, we train a single layer for classification, with
the exception in GPDNN in the cases where an RBFSVM is
trained on top: here we add a hidden layer of 2 neurons.
DNN. Our simple DNN accomodates two hidden layers,
each containing half as many neurons as the dataset has
features, and ReLU activation functions. For the transferability
experiments, the DNN has the same architecture as GPDNN.
SVM. We study a linear SVM and a SVM with an RBF
kernel. They are optimized using squared hinge loss. We
further set the penalty term to 1.0. For the RBF kernel, the γ
parameter is set to 1 divided by the number of features.
C. Implementation and third party libraries
We implement our experiments in Python using the follow-
ing specialized libraries: Tensorflow [1] for DNNs, Scipy [18]
for SVM and GPy [21] for GPLVM and GPC. We rely on
the implementation of the JSMA and FGSM attack from the
library Cleverhans version 1.0.0 [12]. We use the code pro-
vided by Carlini and Wagner for their attacks3. We implement
the linear SVM attack (introduced in [31]) and the GPattacks
(based on GPy) ourselves.
D. Accuracy and Convergence of Target Models
Before we start investigating the actual transferability task
and the adversarial example crafting, we want to comment
on the achieved accuracies on the previously defined datasets.
Since we encountered some difficulty training the LSANs, we
comment on this as well.
Convergence. LSAN networks need to be trained for 7000
iterations, much longer than a conventional DNN. Also its
parameters, such as the initial weights, learning rate and bias
initialization need to be carefully selected to have the two
networks converge.
For RBF-DNN, the LSAN approximating RBF-kernel
SVMs, we could find no initial parameters to guarantee con-
vergence globally. The same holds for the LSAN and a linear
kernel on MNIST38 and the Malware data. In two settings,
RBF kernel on MNIST91 and linear kernel on MNIST38, we
could not find parameters working with two different random
seeds (one for white box or direct crafting, one for evaluation
in grey box). We thus excluded those networks from the
experiments, and marked them in Table I.
Accuracy. The test accuracies of all classifiers are depicted
in Table I. We only want to compare ML models which achieve
similar accuracies, as not doing so might influence the results
in a unpredictable manner. In cases where specific models fail
to achieve similar accuracy we exclude the outliers.
For the Spam dataset, the highest accuracy is achieved
by DNN (94.2%), other algorithms (GPDNN, GPLVM,GPC,
linSVM) vary between 90.1% and 92.7%. On the Malware
dataset, all classifiers perform better than 99.2%, where
LSANs trained on kernels do not converge. GPDNN achieves
the worst accuracy with 98.2%. On MNIST91, we also observe
all algorithms to perform better than 99.2%, with the exception
of the LSAN trained on a linear kernel (only 98.9). For
MNIST38, the range of accuracies of the resulting classifiers
is more diverse. Most classifiers (DNN, GPLVM, GPC and
RBFSVM) achieve 97.4% to 98.6%. Linear SVM achieves
96.8%, GPDNN and GPC 94.4%.
We exclude all models with low baseline performance, such
as rbfDNN (all settings) and RBF SVM on Spam. LinDNN is
excluded on all datasets except MNIST91, where however we
use it for crafting on the Spam data.
3Retrieved from https://github.com/carlini/nn robust attacks, July 2017.
TABLE I
ACCURACY (ACC) AND KERNEL LOSS (K) OF TRAINED CLASSIFIERS. X
DENOTES NON-CONVERGENCE.
Dataset MNIST38 MNIST91 Hidost Spam
Acc K Acc K Acc K Acc K
DNN 98.6 - 99.6 - 99.7 - 94.2 -
linDNN 96.2 1 98.9 3 X 1.2 80.7 1.6
rbfDNN X .2 93.4 .5 X .2 X .07
GPDNN 94.4 33 99.2 10 98.5 33 91.2 50
GPLVM 97.6 - 99.34 - 98.2 - 91.8 -
GPC 94.4 - 99.6 - 99.2 - 92.7 -
lin SVM 96.8 - 99.5 - 99.9 - 90.1 -
RBF SVM 97.4 - 99.6 - 99.4 - 80.1 -
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we answer all posed research questions given
the previously introduced setting. We start with white box
setting to provide more background, and then move towards
the grey box setting.
In the white box setting, we aim at answering the first RQ.
This question, RQ 1, inquires whether we are able to craft
adversarial examples on GPC in a white box setting.
We then turn to the grey box setting. Here, we start
answering the questions concerning LSAN, RQ 4–RQ 6. We
then describe our results concerning GPC and transferability
to and from GPC, thus RQ 2 and RQ 3. Finally, we focus on
the uncertainty estimates of GP models, and deal with RQ 7
and RQ 8.
A. White Box
Before we start evaluating the experiments, we briefly want
to remark on the attacks used on each dataset. In Section III-C
we argued which norms are feasible for which data. Since we
propose new attacks, however, we ignore these restrictions for
the newly introduced attacks to evaluate them without any
preconceived bias regarding their usefulness. We also kept
other attacks that are not too time consuming in computation,
e.g. FGSM, as a comparison.
For each attack, we briefly state how many adversarial
examples could be computed using the attack on the benign
test data. Additionally, we investigate there average amount of
perturbation necessary for misclassification. This measurement
refers to either the perturbation computed by the attack (as
JSMA, GPJM, Lx) or the perturbation introduced globally (,
for FGSM, GPFGS and the attack on linear SVMs).
JSMA. The complete results can be found in Table II
(correctly classified adversarial examples) and Table III (per-
turbations needed). On both MNIST tasks, JSMA is able to
produce adversarial examples for all given test samples. This
is not the case in all scenarios: JSMA can only produce
adversarial examples causing misclassification for roughly half
of the samples in the test dataset when targeting LSAN
approximating a linear kernel on MNIST31. We also observe,
for both LSAN on MNIST91, a higher perturbation needed to
fool the respective classifiers. For the other MNIST task we
do not observe a noticable difference.
TABLE II
PERCENTAGE OF CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
CRAFTED BY JBM (JSMA,GPJM) AND CW RESPECTIVELY. X DENOTES
MODELS EXCLUDED FROM EVALUATION.
Dataset MNIST38 MNIST91 Hidost Spam
Attack JBM CW JBM CW JBM CW JBM CW
GPC 69 - 0 - 77 - 28.8 -
GPDNN 0 0 0 0 1.1 0 0 0
linDNN X X 49 0 X X 6 0
DNN 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0
TABLE III
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF FEATURES MODIFIED FOR SUCCESSFUL
ADERVSARIAL EXAMPLES. JBM DENOTES JSMA AND GPJM, Lx
CARLINI WAGNER EXAMPLES. ALL NUMBERS OBSERVED IN A WHITE BOX
SETTING.
Dataset MNIST38 MNIST91 Hidost Spam
Attack JBM L∞ JBM L∞ JBM L0 JBM L2
GPC 2.76 - 1.47 - 2.02 - 6.85 -
GPDNN 1.01 0.04 4.01 0.05 1.01 1.14 3.62 1.2
linDNN X X 4.26 0.08 X X 5.40 1.03
DNN 1.13 1.39 1.85 1.09 0.68 0.01 3.79 1.19
On the Malware dataset, JSMA is not able to produce an
adversarial example in around 1% of the test samples. On
the same dataset, we also observe that LSAN (approximating
GPLVM) need higher amount of perturbation to cause mis-
classification. On the Spam dataset, we can craft adversarial
examples for every test point. The degree of perturbation
introduced for fooling DNN and LSAN (GPDNN) is almost
the same (3.79 for DNN, 3.62 for LSAN).
FGSM. On all datasets, we observe that the decrease in
accuracy with increasing  is much more pronounced on the
DNN than on LSAN. This discrepancy is the most noticeable
in the Spam dataset, where the accuracy drastically declines
for DNN from 93.8% when  = 0.001 to 6.3% when  = 0.4.
For LSAN (GPDNN), the accuracy falls from 90.1% to 22.7%
in the same interval. We suspect that this disparity is due to
gradient masking and should not be interpreted as LSAN being
more robust. When investigating the performance of LSAN in
the grey-box setting later on, we will also see no particular
evidence for improved robustness.
CW/Lx. Due to the long runtime of these attacks, we
crafted a set of 500 examples for each combination of attacks,
classifiers and datasets. Across all datasets, we observe that the
algorithms succeed in crafting adversarial examples for every
test sample. We also measure the perturbations and depict them
in Table III.
SVM-attack. Given the results in Table IV, we observe
the strongest effect with examples crafted using the smallest
−0.001 for all datasets. Also for all datasets, the accuracy in
the worst case of this attack is roughly the same as a random
guess. Compared to the other attacks, this attack is not very
effective.
TABLE IV
PERCENTAGE OF CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
CRAFTED ON LINEAR SVM/DNN FGSM, OR GPFGS IN A WHITE BOX
SETTING.
Dataset  = 0.001 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
M.38 GPC 95.0 94.0 92.6 94.4 95.4 50.4
GPDNN 94.2 91.2 49.9 43.5 41.8 42
lin SVM 48.3 48.5 49.1 49.1 49.1 49.1
DNN 98.9 97.2 3.6 1.1 1.1 1.1
M.91 GPC 99.8 99.8 90.6 51.0 51.0 51.0
GPDNN 99.1 98.1 65.2 56.6 53.7 52.5
lin SVM 50 50 52.2 52.9 52.9 52.9
linDNN 98.3 98.8 97.6 88.3 65.6 53.6
DNN 99.7 99.4 32.6 0.8 0.2 0.2
Hidost GPC 99.2 99.2 98.8 98.2 94.6 94.6
GPDNN 98.3 91.6 90.7 90.8 90.3 89.5
lin SVM 91 92 95 95 95 95
DNN 99.8 98.9 1.3 0.3 0.1 0.1
Spam GPC 92.2 60.6 35.2 35.0 35.0 35.0
GPDNN 90.1 60.2 24.9 23.5 23 22.7
lin SVM 55.2 57.1 63.3 63.1 63.1 63.1
linDNN 81.2 71.1 26.8 27.7 28.6 34.6
DNN 93.8 63.1 7.7 6.3 6.3 6.3
GPJM and GPFGS. Similar to FGSM, a stronger  leads
to lower accuracy on the crafted adversarial examples. At the
same time, there is often a point ( = 0.2 for Spam,  = 0.2
for MNIST91,  = 0.1 for MNIST38), where the accuracy
remains almost constant. We then observe no further decrease
in accuracy on crafted examples. For GPJM, we observe
mixed results, where MNIST91 can be fooled completely. For
other datasets, accuracy decreases to 28.8% (Spam) and 69%
(MNIST38).
For both GP attacks it is necessary to invert the kernel
matrix. This matrix very sparse for the Malware dataset, and
the computation fails. We therefore use a pseudo-inverse to
compute the attack. We still observe only a very moderate
degree of success: only 27% of crafted examples are misclas-
sified. We still answer RQ 1 positively—we are able to craft
adversarial examples for GPC.
B. Transferability
We now investigate the transferability of the attacks de-
scribed in the previous section. We start by investigating the
capabilities of LSAN in approximating their counterparts. We
then investigate GPC and transferability of the attack derived
for, before turning to uncertainty estimates as a defense. For
the interested reader, we provide the detailed results to all
experiments in the Appendix, and use mainly meta statistics
to ease understanding.
C. LSAN: Results of RQ 4–RQ 6
We start by investigating whether LSAN enables attacks on
models that use GPLVM latent space representations or kernels
in general.
RQ 4. We want to verify whether LSAN are a good
classifier for the problem setting their approximation target
was trained in. We refer back to the results outlined in
Table I. When approximating GPLVM, we observe similar
accuracies on MNIST91 (LSAN 99.2%, GPLVM 99.34%)
and Spam (91.2% versus 91.8% originally). On Malware,
LSAN is slightly better than the original by 0.3%. However,
on MNIST38, it performs worse by more than three percent.
In summary, all these approaches perform much better than
random choice, and we thus answer RQ 4 positively. We
will now investigate the efficiency when computing attacks
on LSAN.
RQ 5. To evaluate this question, we compare the accuracy
of the targeted algorithm on different kinds of adversarial
examples. In particular, we compare these accuracies on the at-
tacks computed on LSAN with all other grey box attacks (like
DNN, linear SVM, GPC, and so on). More specifically, we
subtract the accuracy on LSAN examples from the accuracy of
all other related attacks4. We then plot the distribution of these
differences. If the majority of differences is positive, accuracy
on adversarial examples computed on LSAN is higher (and
thus the LSAN attack performs worse). We depict the results
in Figure 3. Ideally, the accuracy of LSAN attacks should be
lower, and consequently, the distributions in Figure 3 would
be shifted towards the right-hand side.
We consider two settings: one for GPLVM and one for
linear SVMs. We start with the results for GPLVM and SVM,
aproximated by GPDNN, shown in Figure 3a. For Malware
and MNIST91 tasks, we observe that the differences are
closely distributed around around zero from the left side.
We also observe some outliers, e.g. for Malware we observe
the GPJM to be much more effective than other techniques.
The accuracy is roughly 61% as compared to over 90% for
JSMA on GPDNN. On MNIST91, the linear SVM attack is
more effective (reducing accuracy to 50% instead of more
than 90%). For MNIST38, we observe that other attacks are
more effective. For the Spam data, we observe large variance,
indicating that no clear trend towards effectiveness for any
particular technique exists. Yet, some positive outliers indicate
that GPDNN are more effective than other attacks. This is
mainly due to the bad performance of the linear SVM attack
(accuracy > 90%) and GPJM (55% accuracy, other Jacobian
attacks are < 20%) on this dataset, however.
We will now investigate the second setting, in particular, the
approximation of a linear SVM by LSAN linDNN. We are left
with two settings, MNIST91 and Spam, due to convergence.
For MNIST91, data is distributed mostly towards the left-hand
side, with strong variance, i.e. we conclude other attacks are
more effective than LSAN. For Spam, we observe a more
centralized distribution, with similar outliers due as observed
for GPDNN.
Globally, we do observe however that all medians (gray)
are close to 0, i.e. the attacks perform equally.
Given the previous results, we conclude that adversarial
examples crafted on LSAN are as effective as other state-of-
the-art algorithms in misleading the approximated technique.
4We subtract GPDNN FGSM  = 0.1 from DNN FGSM  = 0.1, GPFGS
 = 0.1, linear SVM  = 0.1. For Jacobian methods, we subtract GPDNN
JSMA from DNN JSMA, GPC GPJM, and so on.
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Fig. 3. Evaluating RQ 5. We compare the performance of approximated
algorithm when classifying adversarial examples crafted on LSAN and other
methods. We plot the distribution of differences in accuracy for LSAN exam-
ples and examples from other models. On the right hand side, misclassifcation
is higher for LSAN (good). On the left hand side missclassfication is better
for other attacks (bad). We also plot mean (black) and median (gray).
We thus answer RQ 5 negatively. A natural question at this
point is whether LSAN differs at all from a normal DNN,
i.e. whether the process of training a LSAN to approximate a
substitute network produces a different result than training the
DNN on the unprocessed data in the first place.
RQ 6. To evaluate this RQ, we rerun the evaluation on
adversarial examples with a DNN that has the exact same
architecture as the GPDNN. The DNN used in the grey box
setting has the same architecture as the GPDNN. For the
benign data where both are trained on, we already observed
small differences in accuracy described in the previous section.
While the networks are trained on benign data, we are
interested in their behavior on adversarial examples. We thus
compare the difference between the accuracies for all types
adversarial examples. Afterwards, we analyze the distribution
of the deltas. The results for the four datasets and all three
settings are depicted in Figure 4.
a) We first consider how much GPLVM+SVM and DNN
differ. We depict these results in Figure 4a. We observe that
for all datasets, the median is around 0. All distributions are
centered around 0. Yet, the variances are large, and we observe
differences in classification as large as 80 percentage points on
the Spam data. For MNIST, these differences are in the worst
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(a) DNN versus GPLVM+SVM
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(c) DNN versus GPDNN
Fig. 4. Evaluating RQ 6. We compare the accuracies on adversarial examples
of a GPDNN, DNN and GPLVM + SVM on adversarial exmples. To obtain
the distributions, we subtract accuracy from the second model from the first
model for an attack a for all attacks. Hence on the right hand side, the first
model has higher accuracy. On the left hand side, second model performs
with higher accuracy. We also plot mean (black) and median (gray) values.
case still larger than 20 percentage points. Given the median
is always around 0, we conclude that although in most cases
similar, there can be large differences in the behavior.
b) We now compare GPLVM+SVM and GPDNN, e.g. the
latent space classifier and its corresponding LSAN. The results
are shown in Figure 4b. We observe that for all datasets except
Spam, the distribution are dense around 0, e.g. in many cases
where the output is very similar. Furthermore, the overall
variance is small. There are some cases, however, where
GPDNN performs with lower accuracy than GPLVM+SVM:
On Spam data, the distribution is far away from 0 and centered
at around 50 percentage points better. It is also rather uniform.
We conclude that GPDNN approximates GPLVM+SVM rather
closely on MNIST and the Malware dataset.
c) Finally, we investigate the differences between an LSAN
and a DNN, visible in Figure 4c. We observe that for all
datasets except Spam, the distribution are heavy around 0, e.g.
there are many cases where the output is very similar. These
findings are, however, not as pronounced as in the previous
case. This is due to the higher variance caused by larger
differences in the accuracy. For Spam, we observe GPDNN to
consistently performs better than DNN. On the other dataset,
there are some attacks where GPDNN is slightly better,
however also some (MNIST) or many (Malware) settings
where GPDNN performs much worse. In general, we observe
differences of up to 50 (MNIST, Malware) or > 80 (Spam)
percentage points.
Given the differences in classification for this range of
attacks, we answer all parts of RQ 6 positively. There must
be a difference in the inner representations to cause these
differences in behavior. We also observe that LSAN is able
to approximate the targeted technique. We now conclude our
work on LSAN and move on to our attacks on GPC.
D. GPC: Results of RQ 2 and RQ 3
To investigate the transferability concerning GP, we con-
sider two perspectives: First, RQ 2, we investigate whether
adversarial examples crafted on GPC are misclassified by other
algorithms. Second, RQ 3, we question whether adversarial ex-
amples crafted on other algorithms are misclassified by GPC.
We analyze both perspectives by analyzing the accuracies of
both approaches on adversarial examples.
RQ 2. To evaluate this hypothesis, we compare the change
in percentage of accuracy for all algorithms except GPC on
benign test data and adversarial examples computed on GPC
by GPJM and GPFGS 5). We subtract the accuracy on these
adversarial examples from the accuracy of benign test data and
then plot the distribution of the deltas in Figure 5.
For all datasets, we conclude that the adversarial examples
crafted for GPC are also misclassified by other algorithms. We
further observe the average reduction is 20 percentage points
for MNIST. For the Malware data, the average decrease is
slightly higher, and around 27%. With > 40%, the average
5Depending on the dataset, we consider linear SVM, RBF SVM,
GPLVM+SVM, DNN, GPDNN, and linDNN. The last algorithm is only
evaluated on MNIST91. RBF SVM is not evaluated on Spam.
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Fig. 5. Evaluating RQ 2. We compare the reduction in accuracy of non GPC
models to adversarial examples crafted on GPC by substracting the accuracy
on examples crafted on GPFGS and GPJM from the accuracy on benign test
data. We further plot the distribution of these differences. On the right hand
side (of 0) accuracy decreases. We also plot mean (black) and median (gray).
weil
decrease is largest in the Spam data. In some cases, we
observe a small increases in accuracy, this is the case for Spam
and MNIST data. These increases in accuracy are generally
observed for GPFGS for small values of , such as 0.001 and
0.01. Analogously to FGSM, a larger  implies higher rate of
misclassification.
RQ 3. We will now investigate the opposite direction,
e.g. transferability from adversarial examples crafted on other
models on GPC. To answer this question, we subtract the
accuracy on some adversarial examples (all attacks crafted on
non-GPC models) from the accuracy on benign test data. We
plot the distribution of these differences in Figure 6.
We observe for all datasets, attacks and algorithms we
crafted on that they also mislead GPC. The average decrease is,
compared to the previous findings, however smaller. Consider
an average reduction of 30% versus > 40% on the Mal-
ware data, and roughly 15% versus 20% on MNIST91. For
MNIST38, the results are similar on avergage. For Malware,
we observe almost no reductions; however we in general
observe (also for other models) that attacks have low trans-
ferability.
We further observe some cases where accuracy increases
for adversarial examples on GPC. We observe this on Spam
and MNIST38. On the Spam data, this is caused by the linear
SVM attack. This attack is classified (by all models) correctly
in all cases. On MNIST38, the cases where accuracy increases
are FGSM examples with low .
From the previous finding, we conclude that transferability
holds in both directions for GPC. This refers to both adversar-
ial examples crafted on other techniques exported to GPC and
vice versa. We thus answer both RQ 2 and RQ 3 positively.
Given this result, we confirm the threat of adversarial examples
also for GP. On the other hand, there is a crucial difference
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Fig. 6. Evaluating RQ 3. We compare the accuracy of GPC on adversarial
examples (of all models, except GPC). In particular, we subtract the accuracy
on adversarial examples from the accuracy on benign test data. We plot the
distribution of these values. Hence, values > 0 show an decrease of accuracy,
values > 0 and increase of accuracy. We also plot mean (black) and median
(gray).
between a DNN and any GP; uncertainty. We now turn to this
property of GP and investigate whether it is able to alleviate
the effect of adversarial examples.
E. Uncertainty: Results of RQ 7 and RQ 8
Intuitively, the variance of a prediction is low in areas
where training data was observed6. Accordingly, we might
expect the variance to be larger in the vicinity of adversarial
examples. Adversarial examples are likely to lie in regions
away from training data: In high-dimensions the training data
is likely contained on a low-dimensional manifold which is
not orthogonal to the decision boundary. The creation of
an adversarial example usually involves moving towards the
boundary along a short path. However this process usually
moves it away from the regions of training data, and thus
towards areas with few data points, leading to increasing
classification uncertainty. This hypothesis is consistent with
the empirically validated assumption that adversarial examples
stem from a distribution statistically separate from the training
data [13]. Hence, we have investigate the variance reported in
the two GP approaches. In particular, we compare the mean
variance across all adversarial examples and the mean variance
across all benign data points. In the case of GPC, we also
investigate the average absolute value of the latent function.
The intuition is that the behavior of this latent function is
as well different in areas where no data was observed. The
GPLVM, as an unsupervised ML method, does not use class
labels in its initial training and its latent function is therefore
interpreted differently. Here the value of the latent function is
treated as the actual position in the transformed data space.
We will start with GPC (RQ 7).
6For the RBF and many other, stationary kernels.
TABLE V
REJECTED DATA OUTSIDE A 95% CONFICENDE INTERVAL IN PERCENT: BENIGN DATA (BOLD) AND ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLED CRAFTED ON MODEL
ORIGIN
FGSM / linSVM / GPFGS CW
ORIGIN JBM  = .001  = .01  = .1  = .2  = .3  = .4 L0 L2 L∞
MNIST38 0.4
GPC 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 − − −
GPDNN 0.0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 − 0.0 0.0
lin SVM − 4.84 4.84 4.79 1.92 0.0 0.0 − − −
DNN 0.0 0.05 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 − 0.0 0.0
MALW 10.95
GPC 0.0 8.6 6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 − − −
GPDNN 0.0 6.48 5.66 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.39 − −
lin SVM − 8.71 7.08 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 − − −
DNN 0.0 6.48 5.39 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.60 − −
MNIST91 8.86
GPC 29.8 4.0 4.2 9.0 32.0 82.2 100 − − −
GPDNN 20.66 4.52 4.15 3.78 10.49 86.19 100 − 0.0 4.0
lin SVM − 6.25 5.97 4.38 5.32 13.11 91.98 − − −
linDNN 6.12 4.52 4.1 3.5 6.48 47.43 47.62 − 0.0 3.60
DNN 31.25 4.52 4.15 3.68 8.82 83.16 100 − 0.2 4.2
SPAM 8.11
GPC 96.63 3.6 3.6 44.6 100 100 100 − − −
GPDNN 100 4.06 4.06 5.58 88.70 88.99 88.99 4.0 0.0 4.2
lin SVM − 3.98 4.06 11.66 100 100 100 − − −
linDNN 100 3.98 3.91 7.31 99.78 99.86 99.86 11.17 0.2 9.0
DNN 100 3.98 3.98 5.94 100 100 100 11.01 0.0 7.2
TABLE VI
AVERAGE VARIANCE OF GPC’S LATENT FUNCTION FOR BENIGN DATA (BOLD) AND ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES CRAFTED ON MODEL ORIGIN.
FGSM / linSVM / GPFGS CW
ORIGIN JBM  = .001  = .01  = .1  = .2  = .3  = .4 L0 L2 L∞
MNIST91 6.382
GPC 11.2881 6.6112 6.6309 7.9870 11.9395 18.3882 27.2005 − − −
GPDNN 10.0864 6.3756 6.3226 6.8299 9.9377 15.5973 23.6065 − 3.5384 6.1729
lin SVM − 6.5400 6.4951 6.5498 8.1024 11.1595 15.6267 − − −
linDNN 9.3149 6.3751 6.3152 6.2002 7.2703 9.5647 13.0087 − 3.3542 6.3026
DNN 11.0323 6.3755 6.3225 6.8148 9.8171 15.2891 23.0491 − 3.3890 6.4451
SPAM 6.1651
GPC 103.1185 6.3407 6.5151 38.4048 131.4167 199.3153 215.8200 − − −
GPDNN 132.7886 6.6645 6.5974 17.2383 57.2994 116.3130 162.1923 6.6377 0.6579 7.1669
lin SVM − 6.6432 6.8533 25.3305 81.3637 151.2960 196.8120 − − −
linDNN 125.1362 6.6596 6.5697 19.3221 66.0221 131.8758 182.6009 8.4672 0.7560 6.1990
DNN 129.9440 6.6452 6.4237 17.1022 60.0533 125.3152 179.3707 7.3519 0.6059 6.7201
RQ 7. The averaged variance values for the tested cases
are shown in Table VI. We can immediately observe that the
different type of attacks have different degrees of impact on the
variance. The most noticeable changes are related to methods
that introduce global changes. The larger these changes, the
larger the increase in variance of GPC. The variance also
strongly increases for all Jacobian based methods. Interest-
ingly, we see a decrease in variance for L2 and small increases
for the other attack metrics in adversarial examples crafted by
the Carlini-Wagner (CW) algorithms.
We also observe differences when monitoring the averaged
absolute latent function. The detailed results for this experi-
ment are shown in the Appendix.
We thus investigate a straight forward defense, which is
computing the 95% confidence interval of the data and re-
jecting all data points that are outside this interval. Here, we
use both the latent variance and latent mean. We present our
results in Table V. We observe this simple step to be very
successful on the Spam data (except on the Lx attacks). On
MNIST91 we observe mixed results. On MNIST38 and the
Malware data the approach does not work well. An additional
observation is that on the two datasets where the defense works
well, LSAN examples are in many cases harder to detect than
other adversarial examples.
To conclude, different methods for generating adversarial
examples lead to different responses in the mean and the
variance of the GPC’s latent function. In a first step, we saw
that (depending on the data), we are able to exploit this as a
TABLE VII
AVERAGE VARIANCE OF GPLVM PREDICTIONS FOR BENIGN DATA (BOLD) AND ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES CRAFTED BY
ALGORITHM ORIGIN
FGSM / linSVM / GPFGS CW
ORIGIN JBM  = .001  = .01  = .1  = .2  = .3  = .4 L0 L2 L∞
SPAM 2.3e−06
GPC 0.0001 2.4e−06 2.4e−06 4.5e−06 1.6e−05 5.3e−05 0.0001 − − −
GPDNN 8.4e−06 2.4e−06 2.4e−06 3.7e−06 8.8e−06 2.2e−05 5.2e−05 2.6e−06 1.4e−06 2.7e−06
lin SVM − 2.3e−06 2.3e−06 3.2e−06 6.2e−06 1.3e−05 2.7e−05 − − −
linDNN 5.6e−05 2.4e−06 2.5e−06 4.5e−06 1.2e−05 3.0e−05 7.0e−05 2.9e−06 1.5e−06 2.3e−06
DNN 1.4e−05 2.4e−06 2.4e−06 3.6e−06 8.6e−06 2.1e−05 4.9e−05 2.4e−06 1.4e−06 3.0e−06
MNIST91 0.0083
GPC 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 − − −
GPDNN 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 0.0084 0.0077 0.0065 0.0058 − 0.0081 0.0083
lin SVM − 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 − − −
linDNN 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 0.0080 0.0077 0.0076 − 0.0081 0.0083
DNN 0.0085 0.0083 0.0083 0.0085 0.0078 0.0066 0.0060 − 0.0081 0.0083
MALW 0.0682
GPC 0.0889 0.0714 0.0712 0.0760 0.0882 0.1102 0.1160 − − −
GPDNN 0.0731 0.0736 0.0735 0.0740 0.0775 0.0879 0.2297 0.0892 − −
lin SVM − 0.0632 0.0640 0.1000 0.0955 0.0799 0.2779 − − −
DNN 0.0784 0.0737 0.0736 0.0748 0.0738 0.0753 0.1035 0.0553 − −
MNIST38 0.0208
GPC 0.0208 0.0208 0.0208 0.0208 0.0208 0.0208 0.0208 − − −
GPDNN 0.0208 0.0208 0.0208 0.0207 0.0207 0.0207 0.0207 − 0.0207 0.0208
lin SVM − 0.0208 0.0208 0.0208 0.0208 0.0208 0.0208 − − −
DNN 0.0208 0.0208 0.0208 0.0207 0.0207 0.0207 0.0207 − 0.0207 0.0208
defense. It will be future work to investigate how to improve
this by selecting other thresholds. Further we can influence the
parameters learned for the covariance function. In our case,
this function is similar to the RBF kernel, for which many
security properties are known already [37].
Therefore, these measures mitigate some of the threat ad-
versarial examples pose. We thus answer RQ 7 positively.
RQ 8. We show the variances of GPLVM for all kinds of
adversarial examples in Table VII. For both MNIST tasks, we
observe changes of +0.0001 or +0.0005 in the variance, if
there are changes at all. For the Malware and Spam data, we
do observe some changes: on the Spam data, the variance is
an order of magnitude less. On the Malware data, variance
shifts from 0.068 to 0.074 or 0.08.
As the degree of the differences is relatively insignificant,
we suspect the variance provided in the predictions of GPLVM
is not sufficiently informative about whether a data point is an
adversarial example. We therefore cannot give a conclusive
answer to RQ 8. Nevertheless, we might be able to modify
GPLVM’s kernel to cause greater sensitivity to adversarial
input. For example, shortening its lengthscale might force
the variance to increase more quickly when moving away
from training data locations. Investigating and determining the
optimal hyper-parameters to alleviate the threat of adversarial
examples for GPLVM is left as future work.
VII. RELATED WORK
Transferability has been investigated in the context of
adversarial examples has been brought up by Papernot et
al. [31]. Rosza et al.[36] study transferability for different
deep neural network architectures, whereas Liu et al. [24]
investigate targeted transferability in particular. Finally Tramer
et al. [44] explore transferability by examining the decision
boundaries of different classifiers.
In contrast to all these works, we target explicitly security
contexts with their binary setting. We further also focus on
the usage of kernels and latent space and their effect on
transferability.
Other, loosely related works included the work by Biggio et
al. [4] and Papernot et al. [31]. Both introduce several attacks,
among them attacks for SVM. In our work, we do not target
SVM directly, but approximate them to apply common neural
network based attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one approach to
connect Gaussian processes to adversarial machine learning
by Bradshaw et al. [6]. They do, however, only consider
so-called Gaussian Hybrid networks, where the last layer of
the neural network is replaced by a Gaussian process, and
they evaluate the robustness of hybrid DNNs based only on
FGSM and the attack by Carlini and Wagner. In contrast, our
work targets Gaussian latent space models and Gaussian Pro-
cess classification and studies transferability more extensively,
using adversarial examples crafted by more algorithms and
across several datasets.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored the robustness of Gaussian
Processes (GP), a machine learning model based on Bayesian
Interference. We studied adversarial examples in this setting,
coming to the following three main conclusions:
First, Gaussian Processes are as well vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples. We constructed three novel attacks on
GPs: Targeting GP classification in a supervised setting, we
developed GPFGS and GPJM. Targeting GP Latent Variable
models in an unsupervised setting, we proposed LSAN, a
novel approach to approximating an arbitrary Latent Space
representation.
Second, LSAN adversarial examples exhibit a less notice-
able impact on uncertainty estimates while causing a similar
amount of missclassifications. Further, LSAN approximate
their target latent space models well in terms of behavior.
Third, Adversarial examples produced by state-of-the-art
attacks noticeably affect uncertainty estimates in GP classifi-
cation. We empirically investigated how adversarial examples
affect the uncertainty estimates. In the case of GP classifica-
tion, we observed significant changes to the latent function
mean values and variance, suggesting that as adversarial
examples attempt to cross the classification boundary, they
also move towards areas of lower confidence. Interestingly, we
also observe that the uncertainty estimates even vary between
adversarial examples produced by different algorithms. Finally,
we implemented a straight forward defense based on the 95%
confidence of the latent function of GPC. We observe this
simple defense to work reasonably well in two of four datasets.
Determining further configuration and effect of parameters
learned by GPC is, however, left as future work.
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APPENDIX
MNIST38 FGSM / linSVM / GPFGS CW
origin target JBM  = .001  = .01  = .1  = .2  = .3  = .4 l2 li
GPC 72.9 95.6 95.8 95.6 95.8 84.2 50.4 − −
GPDNN 65.2 93.2 93.6 88.8 80.8 74.8 68.6 − −
GPLVM 75.5 97.2 97.4 97.2 94.8 93.0 89.6 − −
GPC lin SVM 76.8 97.4 96.4 78.0 65.2 58.6 54.8 − −
RBF SVM 77.4 98.0 98.0 94.4 87.8 82.2 78.6 − −
DNN 81.9 99.2 99.2 95.2 83.2 73.6 65.0 − −
GPC 93.8 94.7 94.8 94.7 91.3 66.4 49.0 53.2 94.2
GPDNN 94.2 93.8 93.9 90.8 81.4 68.2 57.9 52.6 94.6
GPLVM 97.7 97.6 97.7 97.7 97.3 95.4 90.3 53.4 98.4
GPDNN lin SVM 92.7 96.9 96.7 86.0 75.4 74.1 73.9 52.8 97.2
RBF SVM 96.9 97.4 97.3 96.8 93.8 88.2 80.0 52.6 97.4
DNN 98.4 98.7 98.7 97.8 94.2 85.7 73.2 52.8 98.6
GPC − 47.7 47.6 47.8 48.4 48.2 49.0 − −
GPDNN − 48.5 48.5 49.3 50.9 50.8 48.1 − −
GPLVM − 48.2 48.1 48.2 48.4 48.6 48.6 − −
linSVM lin SVM − 48.3 48.5 49.1 49.1 49.1 49.1 − −
RBF SVM − 48.2 48.3 48.5 49.1 49.3 49.2 − −
DNN − 48.3 48.3 48.8 48.6 49.3 49.1 − −
GPC 90.8 94.7 94.6 93.1 89.1 64.7 49.1 54.4 95.8
GPDNN 91.0 93.8 93.6 89.0 77.5 61.8 48.5 66.0 93.2
GPLVM 97.3 97.6 97.6 97.0 94.6 87.2 71.6 43.2 98.2
DNN lin SVM 84.9 96.9 95.9 59.0 47.5 44.9 41.3 53.2 96.6
RBF SVM 95.8 97.4 97.1 91.1 68.0 37.8 17.8 59.4 97.2
DNN 97.4 98.7 98.6 91.6 51.8 22.3 8.6 47.4 98.8
TABLE VIII
GRAY BOX EVALUATION ON MNIST38 FOR ALL DESCRIBED ATTACKS. PERCENTAGE INDICATED HOW MANY ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES ARE CORRECTLY
CLASSIFIED BT THE MODEL IN target, WHEN CRAFTED ON origin USING THE CORRESPONDING ATTACK. JBM DENOTES JACOBIAN BASED METHODS,
SUCH AS JSMA ON DNN OR GPJM FOR GPC. − DENOTES THAT AN ATTACK WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED FOR A GIVEN ALGORITHM. METHODS WITH
INSUUFFICIENT ACCURACY (TABLE I) ARE EXLUDED FROM EVALUATION.
MNIST91 FGSM / linSVM / GPFGS CW
origin target JBM  = .001  = .01  = .1  = .2  = .3  = .4 l2 li
GPC 97.4 100.0 100.0 97.0 51.0 51.0 51.0 − −
GPDNN 97.4 100.0 100.0 95.2 55.4 52.2 51.8 − −
GPLVM 98.2 99.4 99.2 99.6 99.6 99.0 94.6 − −
GPC lin SVM 84.2 99.8 99.8 61.8 51.0 51.0 51.0 − −
RBF SVM 98.8 100.0 100.0 93.0 51.0 51.0 51.0 − −
linDNN 89.6 99.0 98.6 87.0 51.0 51.0 51.0 − −
DNN 92.8 100.0 100.0 83.4 51.0 51.0 51.0 − −
GPC 99.5 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.5 98.0 84.0 56.6 99.4
GPDNN 98.8 99.3 99.2 97.2 69.0 50.2 47.4 45.4 99.4
GPLVM 99.3 99.3 99.3 99.3 99.3 99.1 98.8 54.6 99.6
GPDNN lin SVM 99.2 99.5 99.5 99.2 95.8 85.3 68.0 48.0 99.6
RBF SVM 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.4 96.2 99.8 48.8 99.6
linDNN 98.2 98.6 98.4 97.6 91.5 69.8 53.4 48.4 98.2
DNN 99.6 99.7 99.7 99.7 97.7 82.8 65.0 60.6 99.8
GPC − 50.1 50.1 50.3 49.9 49.9 50.4 − −
GPDNN − 50.1 50.1 50.0 48.6 47.4 47.1 − −
GPLVM − 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 − −
lin SVM lin SVM − 50.0 50.0 52.4 52.9 52.9 52.9 − −
RBF SVM − 50.2 50.1 50.0 50.0 50.5 51.3 − −
linDNN − 50.0 50.0 50.1 50.0 49.9 49.9 − −
DNN − 50.1 50.1 50.2 50.6 50.5 51.4 − −
GPC 99.6 99.6 99.5 99.3 98.0 93.0 77.2 99.8 99.8
GPDNN 84.8 99.3 99.2 98.9 97.9 96.2 90.1 47.6 99.0
GPLVM 99.2 99.3 99.3 99.0 98.6 98.1 95.8 54.0 99.8
linDNN lin SVM 82.4 99.5 99.5 99.3 98.5 96.5 91.4 94.8 99.8
RBF SVM 99.5 99.6 99.5 99.5 98.1 94.1 99.8 98.2 99.6
linDNN 99.4 98.6 98.6 97.2 88.6 67.8 53.8 100.0 99.8
DNN 96.2 99.7 99.7 99.4 98.1 96.1 91.9 60.8 99.8
GPC 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.1 93.2 54.3 40.7 99.8 100.0
GPDNN 98.6 99.3 99.2 96.5 70.8 52.5 50.5 47.4 99.4
GPLVM 99.3 99.3 99.3 99.2 99.0 98.6 96.5 53.4 99.4
DNN lin SVM 97.1 99.5 99.4 90.7 40.4 22.6 9.4 95.8 99.6
RBF SVM 99.6 99.6 99.5 99.3 83.6 45.1 40.2 100.0 99.8
linDNN 96.0 98.5 98.4 94.3 63.0 46.0 45.4 93.0 98.8
DNN 99.7 99.7 99.8 98.8 63.3 44.5 41.1 61.0 100.0
TABLE IX
GRAY BOX EVALUATION ON MNIST91 FOR ALL DESCRIBED ATTACKS. PERCENTAGE INDICATED HOW MANY ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES ARE CORRECTLY
CLASSIFIED BT THE MODEL IN target, WHEN CRAFTED ON origin USING THE CORRESPONDING ATTACK. JBM DENOTES JACOBIAN BASED METHODS,
SUCH AS JSMA ON DNN OR GPJM FOR GPC. − DENOTES THAT AN ATTACK WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED FOR A GIVEN ALGORITHM. METHODS WITH
INSUUFFICIENT ACCURACY (TABLE I) ARE EXLUDED FROM EVALUATION.
Malware FGSM / linSVM / GPFGS CW
origin target JBM  = .001  = .01  = .1  = .2  = .3  = .4 l0
GPC 67.5 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 95.4 95.4 −
GPDNN 63.2 94.6 88.2 50.0 39.6 29.4 25.0 −
GPC GPLVM 61.4 94.4 94.4 94.0 94.0 94.4 94.4 −
lin SVM 21.9 100.0 100.0 65.8 39.0 24.8 18.8 −
RBF SVM 23.7 99.6 99.6 94.8 75.8 62.8 53.4 −
DNN 78.1 95.4 95.4 95.4 95.4 95.4 95.4 −
GPC 98.5 98.5 98.5 98.5 98.5 98.5 94.8 97.2
GPLVM 94.5 94.3 94.4 94.4 94.2 94.3 94.5 95.0
GPDNN GPDNN 93.9 96.0 96.6 93.7 93.4 93.8 93.7 96.1
lin SVM 99.7 99.9 99.9 97.2 95.5 95.4 95.4 100.0
RBF SVM 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.2 95.5 95.3 95.3 98.9
DNN 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 94.6
GPC − 98.5 98.9 96.6 96.7 100.0 100.0 −
GPLVM − 95.2 94.6 91.3 91.4 91.0 91.2 −
lin SVM GPDNN − 95.8 95.6 96.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 −
lin SVM − 100.0 99.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 −
RBF SVM − 98.9 98.8 98.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 −
DNN − 95.2 96.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 −
GPC 98.5 98.5 98.5 98.5 98.5 98.6 95.0 98.2
GPLVM 94.5 94.3 94.3 94.5 93.5 93.0 92.9 94.8
DNN GPDNN 94.3 96.2 97.8 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.6
lin SVM 65.0 99.9 99.9 96.2 94.2 90.1 81.3 100.0
RBF SVM 98.2 99.4 99.4 98.9 94.8 93.8 89.6 99.6
DNN 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 94.8
TABLE X
GRAY BOX EVALUATION ON THE MALWARE DATASET FOR ALL DESCRIBED ATTACKS. PERCENTAGE INDICATED HOW MANY ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
ARE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED BT THE MODEL IN target, WHEN CRAFTED ON origin USING THE CORRESPONDING ATTACK. JBM DENOTES JACOBIAN
BASED METHODS, SUCH AS JSMA ON DNN OR GPJM FOR GPC. − DENOTES THAT AN ATTACK WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED FOR A GIVEN ALGORITHM.
METHODS WITH INSUUFFICIENT ACCURACY (TABLE I) ARE EXLUDED FROM EVALUATION. THE GPC ATTACKS ON THIS DATASET WHERE COMPUTED
USING A PSEUDO-INVERSE DUE TO SPARSITY OF THE DATA.
SPAM FGSM / linSVM / GPFGS CW
origin target JBM  = .001  = .01  = .1  = .2  = .3  = .4 l0 l2 li
GPC 39.0 91.2 67.2 35.6 35.2 35.2 35.2 − − −
GPDNN 49.4 88.8 73.8 35.6 35.2 35.0 35.0 − − −
GPC GPLVM 55.1 93.2 83.2 45.2 39.0 37.6 36.8 − − −
lin SVM 39.3 90.8 81.2 35.2 35.0 35.0 35.0 − − −
DNN 21.6 93.2 59.4 35.6 35.0 35.0 35.0 − − −
GPC 21.1 92.8 77.6 26.4 24.6 24.6 24.7 97.7 62.2 94.8
GPDNN 14.6 88.0 59.3 25.1 24.5 24.4 24.4 97.0 87.0 89.6
GPDNN GPLVM 19.3 93.3 86.5 35.0 30.4 29.6 28.0 97.7 64.2 93.2
lin SVM 17.0 90.0 84.2 25.7 24.7 24.6 24.7 96.7 61.2 90.4
DNN 15.9 93.6 74.9 26.4 25.1 25.1 25.0 98.7 63.4 94.8
GPC − 91.7 91.4 99.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 − − −
GPDNN − 90.4 90.9 99.6 99.9 99.9 100.0 − − −
lin SVM GPLVM − 93.4 90.9 98.0 99.7 100.0 100.0 − − −
lin SVM − 98.7 98.4 99.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 − − −
DNN − 93.3 94.8 99.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 − − −
GPC 40.1 92.8 89.4 31.4 22.9 22.0 21.9 94.7 95.2 97.0
GPDNN 26.8 88.6 78.6 24.2 21.9 21.6 21.4 86.5 67.0 91.2
linDNN GPLVM 28.5 93.3 90.2 34.7 24.5 21.2 23.2 95.3 91.4 96.0
lin SVM 27.6 90.2 88.8 24.4 21.7 20.9 21.1 95.9 77.4 93.8
DNN 44.8 93.6 86.2 25.6 20.6 20.1 19.8 96.5 95.8 96.8
GPC 5.8 92.0 67.0 7.0 5.7 5.6 5.6 97.4 71.6 96.0
GPDNN 8.0 87.0 55.1 6.5 5.8 5.7 5.6 92.2 66.8 94.4
DNN GPLVM 12.8 93.1 82.3 20.8 11.2 7.0 6.4 96.8 78.2 95.2
lin SVM 5.7 89.6 80.0 6.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 94.8 68.0 92.0
DNN 5.6 93.4 65.2 6.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 98.8 90.6 97.6
TABLE XI
GRAY BOX EVALUATION ON THE SPAM DATASET FOR ALL DESCRIBED ATTACKS. PERCENTAGE INDICATED HOW MANY ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES ARE
CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED BY THE MODEL IN target, WHEN CRAFTED ON origin USING THE CORRESPONDING ATTACK. JBM DENOTES JACOBIAN BASED
METHODS, SUCH AS JSMA ON DNN OR GPJM FOR GPC. − DENOTES THAT AN ATTACK WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED FOR A GIVEN ALGORITHM. METHODS
WITH INSUUFFICIENT ACCURACY (TABLE I) ARE EXLUDED FROM EVALUATION.
TABLE XII
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE LATENT FUNCTION IN GPC FOR BENIGN DATA (BOLD) AND ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLED CRAFTED BY ALGORITHM ORIGIN
FGSM / linSVM / GPFGS CW
ORIGIN JBM  = .001  = .01  = .1  = .2  = .3  = .4 L0 L2 L∞
MNIST38 1.2e−08
GPC 5.9e−10 2.5e−08 2.2e−08 1.7e−09 1.3e−11 2.8e−15 7.4e−21 − − −
GPDNN 5.0e−10 1.2e−08 − 8.1e−09 6.9e−09 6.9e−09 6.9e−09 − 4.4e−10 6.3e−09
lin SVM − 3.0e−05 2.9e−05 6.9e−06 1.1e−07 1.4e−10 2.4e−14 − − −
DNN 2.1e−10 1.2e−08 1.2e−08 2.2e−09 8.3e−12 7.9e−16 2.6e−21 − 1.2e−09 5.1e−09
MALW 0.3107
GPC 0.0015 0.3310 0.3058 0.0009 2.5e−11 8.1e−24 2.9e−41 − − −
GPDNN 0.0647 0.2902 0.2856 0.0602 0.0425 0.0425 0.0425 0.2689 − −
lin SVM − 0.3202 0.3079 0.0034 3.6e−09 4.1e−19 6.8e−33 − − −
DNN 0.0156 0.2902 0.2843 0.0151 1.8e−06 3.5e−11 3.5e−11 0.3504 − −
MNIST91 3.4882
GPC 0.7435 3.5899 3.5922 3.6342 5.2576 7.5555 9.7121 − − −
GPDNN 3.2410 3.4837 3.4403 2.9515 2.3955 1.8452 1.4223 − 0.1761 3.4914
lin SVM − 3.4684 3.4445 3.1430 2.8010 2.4758 2.2381 − − −
linDNN 1.7944 3.4834 3.4399 3.0198 2.5746 2.1854 1.9898 − 0.4280 3.5067
DNN 2.7306 3.4766 3.3723 2.3512 1.3243 1.1206 1.5329 − 0.4152 3.5237
SPAM 3.4721
GPC 2.8031 3.5125 3.7226 19.8975 16.7526 5.8205 0.9995 − − −
GPDNN 4.8688 3.4383 2.6910 9.8136 13.1723 10.2244 5.7578 3.7572 0.7516 3.4976
lin SVM − 3.4656 3.7542 14.5256 17.7568 12.3758 5.7286 − − −
linDNN 2.1913 3.4713 2.7505 7.4281 10.9106 8.6904 4.7270 3.7479 1.1334 3.8841
DNN 12.3196 3.3805 2.2771 12.1908 17.6029 13.9747 7.5925 3.8349 0.6372 3.5961
TABLE XIII
STANDART DEVIATION OF ABSOLUTE LATENT FUNCTION FOR BENIGN DATA (BOLD) AND ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES IN GPC. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
CRAFTED BY ALGORITHM ORIGIN.
FGSM / linSVM / GPFGS CW
ORIGIN JBM  = .001  = .01  = .1  = .2  = .3  = .4 L0 L2 L∞
textbfMNIST38 3.1e−27
GPC 2.6e−33 4.4e−26 2.6e−26 1.5e−32 4.8e−42 1.2e−55 1.1e−77 − − −
GPDNN 1.3e−33 3.2e−27 3.2e−27 3.0e−27 3.0e−27 3.0e−27 3.0e−27 − 2.5e−36 3.3e−30
lin SVM − 3.1e−16 2.9e−16 9.0e−19 5.9e−26 4.4e−37 2.6e−51 − − −
DNN 2.3e−35 3.2e−27 3.0e−27 1.5e−30 7.1e−41 4.1e−57 8.1e−79 − 5.7e−35 9.8e−31
MALW 0.055
GPC 9.7e−10 0.0585 0.0439 3.8e−12 3.7e−42 5.3e−92 1.2e−161 − − −
GPDNN 0.0005 0.0403 0.0371 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0408 − −
lin SVM − 0.0539 0.0456 5.9e−10 6.9e−34 3.4e−73 1.8e−125 − − −
DNN 1.5e−06 0.0403 0.0366 2.6e−07 5.4e−23 1.2e−36 1.2e−36 0.0724 − −
MNIST91 0.88
GPC 0.0324 0.8576 1.2861 68.3405 159.9887 137.8570 112.8514 − − −
GPDNN 0.9988 0.8809 0.8869 0.9838 1.3636 2.0621 2.2800 − 0.0006 0.8321
lin SVM − 0.9888 0.9119 0.6754 1.3324 3.3815 6.4679 − − −
linDNN 0.0925 0.8721 0.8073 0.5993 1.1210 2.7048 4.1999 − 0.0031 0.9014
DNN 0.8581 0.8817 0.8970 1.0513 1.1125 0.2479 0.6343 − 0.0014 0.8501
SPAM 63.9184
GPC 40.5977 76.8750 92.2008 318.4397 39.9429 0.6991 0.0012 − − −
GPDNN 53.2261 67.7945 66.3834 347.6565 945.0137 284.5576 44.7802 62.0666 0.0469 64.3927
lin SVM − 57.0357 62.4931 29.0840 16.0576 7.5440 0.6712 − − −
linDNN 6.4428 64.9965 49.1872 178.5613 530.6283 347.7331 70.0789 83.4065 1.9466 71.6031
DNN 113.8493 65.5118 36.6047 99.7421 111.9318 67.0232 17.7011 68.9255 0.0180 57.8335
